1991 Iraqi missile attacks against Israel

Overview

On 17 January 1991, Iraq initiated a missile campaign against Israel. Over the course of the next month, approximately 42 Scud missiles were fired into Israeli territory, primarily at the cities of Tel Aviv and Haifa. The missile attacks began on the same day as the Gulf War aerial bombardment campaign, which was targeting military infrastructure within Iraqi-occupied Kuwait. As many Muslim-majority countries were actively contributing to the American-led military coalition, the Iraqi government had expected them to rescind their support if Israel responded to the missile campaign by attacking Iraq. However, Israel was convinced by Jordan and the United States to not retaliate: Jordanian king Hussein bin Talal had persuaded Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir to consider Jordan's stability and not violate Jordanian airspace during a bilateral meeting two weeks earlier; and the Bush administration had increased defense aid to Israel for the purpose of actively countering Iraq's barrages and preventing an Israeli counterattack, thereby ensuring that the coalition's Muslim countries did not withdraw. On 23 February 1991, the coalition began a ground offensive into Iraqi-occupied Kuwait and Iraq proper. According to UK Cabinet Office records, the then-Minister of Defense of Israel, Moshe Arens said in a meeting at the White House that the Iraqi attacks had caused "extensive damage" in Israel.

Overview adapted from Wikipedia, licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0.

Significance

Iraq's Scud missile campaign against Israel, launched on the same day as the coalition's aerial bombardment of Kuwait, was a deliberate attempt to fracture the Gulf War coalition by provoking an Israeli military response. Iraqi planners calculated that Muslim-majority states contributing forces to the American-led coalition would withdraw if Israel entered the conflict by striking Iraq. The strategy was neutralized through coordinated diplomatic and material pressure: Jordanian King Hussein bin Talal had persuaded Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir weeks before the campaign began to avoid violating Jordanian airspace, and the Bush administration increased defense aid to Israel specifically to counter the missile barrages and discourage retaliation. Israel's restraint preserved coalition unity through both the air campaign and the ground offensive that began on 23 February 1991. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens later described the attacks as having caused extensive damage inside Israel, underscoring the domestic cost of that restraint. The episode demonstrated how non-belligerent states could become instruments of an adversary's coalition strategy, and how diplomatic management of a third party proved as operationally consequential as battlefield decisions.